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Mc Namara, Tillerson, Woods. The World Bank. Specialisation ( Revolving Doors) All Roads lead to and from the Petro Dollar. Oil Shock or Ouile Quelle Suprise.

Oil Shock! or Ouile Quelle Suprise!


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Trump Won’t Be Cancelling World War 3 After All #S… https://t.co/VblrmbDPJz #StandDownMrTrump

“T’is hard the kinds of Knowledge are but two, The One erroneous, the Other true. The former profits nothing when ’tis gain’d, The other’s difficult to be attain’d.”…
LETTHEMCONFECTSWEETERLIES.BLOGSPOT.COM/2017/04/TRU…

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Roger Lewis
Roger Lewis Hi Ruby, Sadly I think that is true, the Oligarchy was firmly secured by the Bankers in the 2008 ´´Crash´´. The Petrodollar sword of Damocles has haunted every US president since Gerald Ford and it is clear from published documents and correspondence that the Monetary System and Banking have been elevated to an importance above democracy and Laws. President Trump would have had some idea of the generality of the question as many do but only those who put on the shoes of A president or World leader will be made aware of the full picture, the rest of us can only guess as to what exactly is causing the successive apparent loss of all humanity and reason when office is assumed ( I must confess I felt this more acutely when it happened to Obama) . I have been reading the Pearson and Brandt Commission reports the past few days following up on a reference to the Committee of Twenty in the 1973 Bilderberg Minutes. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/…/Pearson_Commission_on…

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandt_Report the follow up to the Brandt report is a report called the Brandt Equation. 

The Brandt Equation was written by this Guy James Quilligan http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/James_Quilligan
Who´s work is fascinating and I will be reading more of his work.
This paper of Quilligans is very good although the Language is too Jargony for it to truly blossom and gain traction ( in my opinion, at any rate, the style does not resonate with me)) in a wider readership, this is a shame.
http://www.kosmosjournal.org/…/the-commons-and-integral…

The Pearson Commission on International Development investigated the effectiveness of the World Bank’s development assistance in the 20 years to 1968 and made recommendations for future operation of the organization.
EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

A CONVERSATION WITH JULIAN GRENFELLWASHINGTON, D.C.July 15, 1986Robert W. Oliver

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/925491468180247016/pdf/790130TRN0Gren0erview0July015001986.pdf

“I was on a visit that he made to East Africa the summer
before ’66. We went from Kenya to Uganda. In those days, Milton
Obote was the President of Uganda ~- the first time around. I
remember George Woods, Abdullah El Emory, an Egyptian who was then
Director of the Africa Department of the Bank, George Wishart, a
Scotsman who was Woods’ personal assistant, and 1 had breakfast
together on the terrace of the Lake Victoria Hotel before Woods was
to go off and have a one-on-one conversation with Obote.
As we were having breakfast, he said to El Emory, “Tell me,
Abdullah, we haven’t lent any money to Uganda for a couple of years
because we have disapproved of the economic policies they were
pursuing. We couldn’t get any agreement on the terms of this and
that, We seem to be agreed that we should start lending again if
you’re convinced that there are good things we can lend for.” Then
he said, “How important is it politically that we resume lending?”
El Emory said, “It probably means the difference between Obote
staying in power and Obote going. If the World Bank does not
announce that it’s going to resume lending after your visit, this
is a real blow to a man.” Woods said, “Do we need to keep him in
power? Is there somebody else who could do the job better?” El
Emory said, “No, there is only the army. If you lose Obote, you
lose most of the good people who are with him at the moment, and
the army takes over.” Woods said, “Then I guess we’d better make
the loan. If he is the only guy who can really run this country
other than the army, I guess we’d better make him some loans.”
3
I was sitting there as a very junior staff member eating my
corn flakes and wondering, “My God, is this the way the Bank
operates?” But that was very much Woods. He would always get down
essentially to what was the critical political issue. He was much
talked about as a man. who knew only about investment — a sense of
what needed to be done in certain countries to get their economies
moving, but he was underneath it all a very political man. He
could see that if we do this, we keep the president of an
independent country in power. If we decline to do this we’re
probably condemning him to a revolution. He was a lot smarter than
people gave him credit for. I didn’t say that he was smart
necessarily in the sort of way which the President of the World
Bank ought to be, but he was politically very astute.” 


Transcript of oral history interview with Ernest Stern held on March 2, 198317pp World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/970971468326687651/pdf/791300TRN0Ster0Box0377367B00PUBLIC0.pdf

BLAIR: I get the impression that the Brandt Commission was talking also about tone and style. I think they even said that the Bank was in danger of becoming arrogant. Do you take anything from this?
STERN: That’s always a tough subject. Of course, it’s always easy to find an arrogant staff member in any institution. I’m sure we have our share. All I can say, from my personal experience, is that in discussions with countries where the conditionality issue would be most prominent – that is, in our structural adjustment lending – I have found pretty strong support for what we suggest ought to be done. I’ve had a lot of personal discussions with Ministers and Senior Officials who welcomed the support of the Bank for the changes we have suggested. It helps them internally. We are in fact quite flexible as to the time schedules for actions to be taken and I would be really surprised if any of those countries felt that we were proceeding in a noncollaborative, or even a non-collegial way. There are other countries, clearly, where we have difficult relationships. Tanzania is one of them. There are other cases where countries have taken no action, where the economy is under severe pressure, where distortions are major and where somehow there is the perception that the Bank or IDA should lend anyhow. There, of course, you have a gap in understanding and that can lead certainly to the perception that we are pushing too hard, that we are being unrealistic and, maybe, that we talk from the top down. But, I think that one has to recognize that the resources we have are very difficult to obtain and we are, on the IDA side, very directly responsible to parliaments who have sometimes, as in the case of the United States, very difficult views about what is a useful aid project and how you go about lending. Even on the Bank side, we have to be sure that resources are well used and are repaid on time. Therefore, we cannot have significant operations in countries which simply refuse to face reality. So, it is perfectly possible that some of that perception is around. I don’t think that problem exists in countries where we have done highly conditional lending at a macrolevel. It does exist, I’m sure, in some other countries where we have come pretty much to the end of the road because of the unwillingness of those countries to take any of the necessary policy steps. 

Grenfel and Stern both state diametrically opposed views as to the reception of and importance of the Brand and Pearson Commissions which is an interesting demonstration how briefing anonymously to the press by official sources is a lottery as to which views and policies prevail within any great institutions processes, we often forget that  the throne is not itself secure unless the underpinnings of its processes are soundly supported by able and loyal officials, this true of any organisation, insert your own favourite Pretorian guard cliche.

I like this Grenfel Briefing Note.
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/252941389301412172/wbg-archives-1771349.pdf

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION lih( OFFICE MEMORANDUM 7 TO: Mr William Clark DATE: Geneva, 27 July 77. DECLAssiFID FROM: Julian Grenfell 1 NOV 302012 SUBJECT: Brandt Commission WBG ARCHIVES CONFIMIAL

Sweden : a little less activist since the change of government, but still much listened to;

 Our friend Cabri6 of the Yugoslav delegation has told me that “certain Geneva-based people” are spreading the rumour around that Mr McNamara no longer has any interest in the Brandt Commission and is even against it now. He is quite likely referring to UNCTAD. I have told him that Mr McNamara still stands behind his original initiative, but the ball is now squarely in Brandt’s court. We will give all appropriate assistance but will certainly not create a situation in which it might appear that the Bank was seeking to control the Commission.

Vpn Hoek of ESA has been poor-mouthing the Commission here, and when he did it again at an inter-agency meeting last week I intervened to set him straight.

 Some US delegates, including their no.2 on the ECOSOC delegation, have told me they feel a Brandt/Andy Young meeting in New York might be mutually


The Brandt Equation
21st Century Blueprint for the New Global Economy
Table of Contents

Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
I. Renaissance of the Brandt Reports
A Brandt New World? ……………………………………………………………………………………… 5
The Brandt Proposals: A Report Card……………………………………………………………… 5
Hunger……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6
Poverty …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
Population…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
Women…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
Aid ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10
Debt ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..11
Armaments and Security ………………………………………………………………………………13
Energy and Environment………………………………………………………………………………14
Technology and Corporations………………………………………………………………………..16
Trade ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….17
Money and Finance …………………………………………………………………………………….20
Global Negotiations…………………………………………………………………………………….23
2002 Report to Stakeholders: Global Wealth without Globalization of Benefits……………..27
II. Breakdowns in Global Monetarism
International Banks and the First Debt Crisis: Latin America……………………………………..28
Foreign Investment and the Second Debt Crisis: Southeast Asia …………………………………31
Crisis Finance: Who Wants to be a Lender of Last Resort?………………………………………..33
III. The Dawn of Global Sovereignty
‘Globalization’: Short for Global Privatization………………………………………………………..39
Potential Revolution: Unleashing Global Demand …………………………………………………..41
Democracy International: Mobilizing for Global Development …………………………………..43
IV. Global Action Program
Common Agenda: New Global Round of Negotiations……………………………………………..47
Summit of Government Leaders: For an Emergency Relief Program……………………………48
Popular Referendum of the UN General Assembly: For the Restructuring
of the Global Economy ………………………………………………………………………………..53
Afterword
Earth in the Balance: The Vision of Willy Brandt ……………………………………………………59
Brandt 21 Forum……………………………………………………………………………………………………………63
The Brandt Equation © 2002 by James Bernard Quilligan. Grateful acknowledgment is extended to MIT Press
for permission to use published material from North-South and Common Crisis

The Committee of Twenty

Content and structure area
Scope and content
The Committee of Twenty (C-XX), formally known as the Committee of the Board of Governors on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues, was established by the IMF in 1972 to prepare a draft for a reformed international monetary system after the United States had announced in August 1971 that it was suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The records in this series were compiled by Frank Vibert while he was working in the Policy Planning and Program Review Department (PPR) in the Office of the Vice President for Development Policy (VPD). The records primarily concern two of the Committee’s Technical Groups: the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources and the Technical Group on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Link and Related Proposals. The Bank was asked to participate in the secretariat function for the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources, and Frank Vibert with Azizali Mohammed from the IMF formed the secretariat for the Group. Earnest Stern, Senior Adviser in VPD, was part of the Technical Group on the SDR Link.

The series contains copies of IMF and World Bank studies and other documents that were used as background materials for the Committee or that were drafted in response to specific requests from Committee staff; drafts of and comments from IMF and Bank staff on the Bank paper, Capital Flows to Developing Countries, that was prepared for the Committee; and the issues of the IMF newsletter, IMF Survey, that included articles regarding the Committee of Twenty. The files include: copies of President McNamara’s correspondence with Ernest Stern and with C. Jeremy Morse, the chair of the Deputies of the Committee of Twenty; memoranda exchanged between Vibert and Stern; intra-VPD correspondence and other intra-Bank correspondence relating to the Committee of Twenty and the Technical Groups; Vibert’s correspondence with IMF staff and with the chair of the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources; copies of memoranda Vibert drafted for the chair’s signature; and Vibert’s copies of Stern’s memoranda to the files regarding the SDR Link.

Records maintained for meetings of the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources include: Vibert’s correspondence relating to pre-meeting planning, copies of documents provided as background for the meeting discussions, lists of attendees, copies of the Terms of Reference for the Group, and Vibert’s handwritten notes form the meetings. The files also contain multiple drafts and comments on the drafts of the Group’s report.

Records relating to the Technical Group on the SDR Link include copies of World Bank and IMF documents provided the Group as background materials; copies of statements regarding the SDR Link made by heads of delegations to the Group; notes regarding SDR discussions with the United Kingdom and Germany; and various drafts of the Bank paper Bank Group Uses of SDR Link Resources.


Robert McNamara

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Robert S. McNamara)
This article is about the U.S. business executive and Secretary of Defense. For other uses, see Robert McNamara (disambiguation).
Robert McNamara
Robert McNamara official portrait.jpg
President of the World Bank Group
In office
April 1, 1968 – July 1, 1981
Preceded by George Woods
Succeeded by Tom Clausen
8th United States Secretary of Defense
In office
January 21, 1961 – February 29, 1968[1]
President John F. Kennedy
Lyndon Johnson
Deputy Roswell Gilpatric
Cyrus Vance
Paul Nitze
Preceded by Thomas Gates
Succeeded by Clark Clifford
Personal details
Born Robert Strange McNamara
June 9, 1916
San FranciscoCalifornia, U.S.
Died July 6, 2009 (aged 93)
Washington, D.C., U.S.
Political party Republican (until 1978)[2]
Democratic (1978–2009)[2]
Spouse(s) Margaret Craig (1940–1981)
Diana Masieri Byfield (2004–2009)
Children 3 (including Craig)
Education University of California, Berkeley (BA)
Harvard University (MBA)
Signature
Military service
Allegiance  United States
Service/branch  United States Army
Years of service 1940–1946
Rank US-O5 insignia.svg Lieutenant Colonel
Unit US Army Air Corps Hap Arnold Wings.svg U.S. Army Air Forces
Robert Strange McNamara (June 9, 1916 – July 6, 2009) was an American business executive and the eighth Secretary of Defense, serving from 1961 to 1968 under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, during which time he played a major role in escalating the United States involvement in the Vietnam War.[3]Following that, he served as President of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. McNamara was responsible for the institution of systems analysis in public policy, which developed into the discipline known today as policy analysis.[4] McNamara consolidated intelligence and logistics functions of the Pentagon into two centralized agencies: the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Supply Agency.
Prior to his public service, McNamara was one of the “Whiz Kids” who helped rebuild Ford Motor Company after World War II and briefly served as Ford’s President before becoming Secretary of Defense. A group of advisors he brought to the Pentagon inherited the “Whiz Kids” moniker.

McNamara remains the longest serving Secretary of Defense, having remained in office over seven years.World Bank President[edit]

Robert McNamara served as head of the World Bank from April 1968 to June 1981, when he turned 65.[4] In his 13 years at the Bank, he introduced key changes, most notably, shifting the Bank’s focus toward targeted poverty reduction. He negotiated, with the conflicting countries represented on the Board, a growth in funds to channel credits for development, in the form of health, food, and education projects. He also instituted new methods of evaluating the effectiveness of funded projects. One notable project started during McNamara’s tenure was the effort to prevent river blindness.[4]
Reportedly, McNamara first heard about his appointment as President of the World Bank through a press-leak.[5]
The World Bank currently has a scholarship program under his name.[6]
As World Bank President, he declared at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group that countries permitting birth control practices would get preferential access to resources.

George David Woods

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
George Woods
President of the World Bank Group
In office
January 1, 1963 – April 1, 1968
Preceded by Gene Black
Succeeded by Robert McNamara
Personal details
Born July 27, 1901
BostonMassachusettsU.S.
Died August 20, 1982 (aged 81)
LisbonNew YorkU.S.
George David Woods (July 27, 1901 – August 20, 1982) was a U.S. banker. He served as President of the World Bank from January 1963 until March 1968.

Biography[edit]

George Woods was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1901. After completing high school he was employed as an office boy at Harris, Forbes & Co., an underwriting firm. At the company’s urging, he attended night school in banking, and later became a buyer in the underwriting department. By the age of 26 he had been promoted to a vice president position. In 1930 the firm was acquired by Chase Bank, and Woods was made vice president of the new firm; he later became vice president and member of the board of First Boston Corporation, a newly formed securities company.
First Boston became one of the largest investment banking firms in the United States, and Woods played a major role in it. In 1947 he became one of two executive vice presidents, then in 1948 became chairman of the executive committee. Then, in 1951 Woods became chairman of the board.

World Bank Service[edit]

Woods tenure at the World Bank accompanied its transformation into a more global institution, One emphasis he had was to work to correct the disparity between rich and poor, and North and South. Under Woods, there was an increasing focus on economic analysis in determining root causes for constrained growth in developing nations, and less focus on the basis determination of country creditworthiness.
Under his tenure, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established, which provided assurance for nervous private investors.
Woods was also leader of the World Bank during the effort to assist India, which resulted in the devaluation of the rupee in 1966.

GRENFELL: Yes. I remember him saying at the time that he felt that this was a very good way of recycling the petro dollars, but that • • 25 you had to keep an eye on it because commercial debt could build up as fast and even more expensively than public debt. It occurred to me that he had a very good understanding of what the implications were of the build up of the debt. I think the figures around about that time were that the developing countries as a whole were devoting about 33 percent of all their external resources, funds coming in, on servicing the public debt. He saw the writing on the wall. That was certainly behind his major push to get a huge second replenishment of IDA. It didn’t work, of course. He asked in ’66 for a billion dollars, and he got only 400 million, which was a big disappointment to him. But the reason why he said we must do this, why we must to have this quantum leap in resources for IDA, was very largely because he was worried about the debt structure of the developing countries. Clearly there were a lot of them who needed loans on highly concessionary terms, so in the midst of the debt crisis that we are in now, I look back and think that he had a lot of foresight. He could see it coming when a lot of other people were really not that concerned about it.

OLIVER: The Friedman concept of the IDA replenishment was also 3-4 billion dollars, at least half of which Irving thought should accrue on highly concessionary terms. He pushed for half of that which is where the number $f billion comes from. This was clearly enunciated at least 2 years earlier than the Stockholm speech. 

GRENFELL: Yes, it certainly preceeded that at least 2 years earlier. I think the Stockholm speech was saying, “Look I am 26 leaving the Bank. This is my last major public pronouncement. For Gods sake, listen. This is what is going to happen.” The enthusiasm for the grand assize, which at that time they thought Oliver Franks was going to head, was very much rooted in his, as I say, writing-on-the-wall syndrome. He thought that things could easily get out of hand. He understood very clearly what people like Edward Boyle, and Barbara Ward, and Rene Mayer, and William Clark were saying to him which was that this development decade has run out of steam. The money that is going in is simply not doing the job. It’s raising GNP, standard of living, but it’s not having much impact on poverty. I think he understood that quite clearly. 

Economic Transformation: The Commons and Integral Capital

James Quilligan

James Quilligan

This show continues a big picture emphasis from the first two weeks, with further exploration of the strengths and limitations of our current economic/financial system—an understanding of which is central to realizing desirable and sustainable futures. The show explores the “market state” as we know it, and considers the chronic instability and inherent conflict at play between the private and public sectors—which in many respects pits freedom against equality. James Quilligan introduces a view of the future built upon an expanded perspective of the commons and integral capital —which includes explicit recognition of private capital, public capital, commons capital, and personal capital—and how they come together as a platform for future transformation. The show begins to intentionally showcase the relationship between systems, structures, and behaviors (the exterior forms of life) and the many dimensions of culture and mindsets (the inner nature of life) that inform them.

ZOOM’D bridges the conceptual to the practical for all in business, government, and civil society to benefit from and to activate leadership around.
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Economic Transformation: The Commons and Integral Capital

May 18, 2009
Hosted by John D. Schmidt
Guess: James Quilligan

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